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Mass Media’s Impact on Confidence in Political Institutions:  
The Moderating Role of Political Preferences 
A Preferences- Perceptions Model of Media Effects 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on mass media’s impact on citizens’ confidence in political 
institutions. Drawing on research within the field of political science that builds on the 
discrepancy theory from cognitive psychology, the paper argues that citizens’ 
preferences of how political institutions should work and the outcomes they should 
produce moderate mass media’s impact. Building on research of media framing 
effects on political attitudes an preference-perception model of media effects is 
developed. The model explains how the relationship between political reality 
perceptions that trace back to media coverage and political preferences derived by 
socialization in a political culture accounts for variations in political confidence at the 
individual level. The paper also develops a distinct set of specific media frames that 
correspond to a variety of political preferences as well as aspects of political 
legitimation. The model contributes to further specifications of the relationship 
between mediated political information and political attitudes. 
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Problem and objectives 
This paper focuses on mass media’s impact on citizens’ confidence in political 
institutions. In modern societies that are characterized by functional differentiation, 
confidence appears to be a highly relevant social resource as it serves the reduction 
of complexity and hence facilitates individual behavior as well as collective actions 
(Luhmann, 1989). Thus, Kaina (2004) states that it is the concept of confidence in 
particular which is linked to the issue of stability and persistence of democratic 
systems. Without citizens’ confidence in distinct public institutions, the stability of a 
highly fragmented society would be threatened. 
Are citizens confident because they have the impression that political institutions 
ensure the opportunity to actively participate in the democratic process, like 
referenda in direct democracy for instance? Is confidence in a political institution 
based on the perception that the institution aims at integrating differing positions in 
finding a solution that is based on a broader consensus? Or does confidence in 
institutions depend on the perceived effectiveness of their problem solutions? 
Certainly, all those aspects might have an impact on the highly complex attitudes of 
political support. However, recent research indicates that citizens’ confidence in 
political institutions does not only depend on the perception of political realities, but 
also on corresponding preferences of the citizens. Studies show that the discrepancy 
between citizens’ preferences and the perception of certain aspects of politics 
explains variance in confidence levels (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; 
Kimball & Patterson, 1997). 
This paper thus emphasizes the moderating role of political preferences. As this 
paper focuses on media effects on political attitudes, it makes an effort to integrate 
preferences as moderating variable in a model of media effects on political 
confidence. The paper’s main argument is that political preferences moderate the 
impact of media information on political confidence. 
Whereas political preferences are conceptualized as political values that are 
developed within the process of socialization within a political culture, the perception 
of political realities in modern democracies is mostly mediated through mass media. 
Media framing research indicates that the way events and issues are framed in the 
media can „fundamentally affect how readers and viewers understand those events 
and issues“ (Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997, p. 482). Capella and Jamieson 
(1996) conclude that strategic media frames foster political cynicism. In order to 
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improve the understanding of why media coverage negatively affects political 
attitudes, Besley and McComas (2005) propose to derive more specific media frames 
that refer to aspects of external efficacy, respect, trustworthiness, and neutrality of 
political processes. This paper builds on the argument of Besley & Mc Comas and 
derives specific media frames that correspond to both citizens’ various preferences of 
political actors and institutions as well as aspects of political legitimation as 
discussed in the literature. 
The model to be developed in this paper captures individual-level differences in 
confidence in political institutions and takes central account of the relationship 
between media information, individual political reality perceptions and individual 
political values. The general aim of this paper is to contribute to the specification of 
the relationship between political information and political attitudes. 
The paper builds on two lines of theorizing that I will briefly review in the following 
section. Both strands are combined in an analytical model that is at the core of this 
paper. Finally, it is argued that media coverage patterns do not per se challenge 
political support. Rather, certain media patterns threat political confidence if they 
challenge a citizen’s political preferences.  
 
Confidence in political institutions and mass media 
The role of preferences and different dimensions of political confidence 
According to Easton (1965, 1975) confidence is a dimension of diffuse political 
support. In general, Easton (1975, p. 436) defines political support as “an attitude by 
which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively 
or negatively.” In contrast to specific support which is related to the “satisfactions that 
members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performances 
of the political authorities” (Easton, 1975, p. 437), diffuse support refers to 
“evaluations of what an object is or represents […] not of what it does” (Easton, 1975, 
p. 444).1 Although political support might refer not only to attitudes but also to 
                                                 
1 Empirical results show that the distinction between different attitudes of political support is not only 
analytical relevant but also empirical. A variety of studies indicates that citizens do differentiate 
between different forms of political support like satisfaction and confidence for instance (cf. Easton, 
1975; Fuchs, 1981). This supports the assumption that the concept of confidence as an analytical 
category is useful. 
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behavior (cf. Easton, 1975, p. 436), the interest of this paper is limited to the aspect 
of political support as empirically observable evaluative attitudes of citizens. 
The concept of confidence used here follows further developments of Easton’s 
concept by Fuchs (1993, pp. 100-108) and Kaina (2004). The authors suggest to 
include both, characteristics of political input (i.e. the responsiveness of political 
actors to citizens’ demands) as well as features of political outputs (i.e. the 
effectiveness of political actors to realize those demands) as aspects that confidence 
is related to. Consequently, confidence here involves both a political process and a 
political output perspective. As regards political processes the focus lies on the way 
political decisions are made (“how”). As regards political outputs Kaina (2004, p. 528) 
points out that in contrast to specific political attitudes, confidence is based on certain 
characteristics of political outcomes and their implementations rather than precise 
results. 
The question of whether citizens refer to institutional structures or authorities as 
regards their attitudes of confidence is an empirical open question. Thus the term in 
this paper refers to both citizens’ attitudes towards institutionalized structures and 
rules of formal as well as informal nature (cf. Kaina, 2004, p. 529) and attitudes 
towards incumbent authorities. 
Regarding the influencing factors of confidence levels a variety of studies indicate 
that citizens’ preferences matter. Studies draw on arguments from cognitive 
psychology, the discrepancy theory namely. Patterson and collaborates (S. C. 
Patterson, Boynton, & Hedlund, 1969) were among the first researchers to 
investigate the role of citizens preferences as determinant of political support. Their 
study on perceptions and preferences of the legislature lends support to their main 
hypothesis that congruence between perceptions and preferences fosters support, 
whereas incongruence leads to low support. Hence the authors conclude that 
perception-preferences differentials explain variations in support of the legislature. 
Further empirical validity to this line of theorizing is given by a study of Kimball & 
Patterson (1997). In telephone interviews preferences towards incumbents, their 
motives and connections were measured, as well were according perception of those 
aspects. The authors state that “public attitudes toward Congress hinge very much 
upon public preferences, [and] citizens perceptions of congressional performance” 
(Kimball & Patterson, 1997, p. 722). 
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In their study on process preferences and public approval of government, Hibbing & 
Theiss-Morse (2001a) were able to show that the preference-perception discrepancy 
matters not only regarding attitudes based on the perception of political actors, but 
also regarding aspects of political processes. Their research indicates that the 
combination of citizens’ preferences concerning how political processes should be 
and the perception of how actual procedures takes place explains confidence 
(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001a, 2001b). A process that matches an individual’s 
preferences of how a political process should work increases approval, whereas 
discrepancies decrease support. The authors conclude that “the extend to which 
individuals believe actual processes are inconsistent with their own process 
preferences is an important variable in understanding the current public mood” 
(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001a, p. 145). 
I, then, will build on a solid foundation in assuming that citizens form evaluative 
attitudes regarding political institutions based on their preferences. I assume that 
preferences regarding incumbent characteristics, aspects of political processes as 
well as political outcomes matter. 
As regards the question of where citizens’ preferences come from, the literature 
refers to the role of political values. For instance Fuchs (2002a) states that citizens 
support a political regime to the extend they belief that it is corresponding to their 
political values. Following Almond (1980) it is argued that preferences citizens have 
regarding the political regimes are shaped by their political culture. Preferences refer 
to this part of political values that relates to normative attitudes regarding how a 
political institution should work, the output it should produce or the norms according 
to which political actors should behave. In other words, preferences are those 
political values that define a sort of prototype of preferable political institution or actor 
(cf. Parsons, 1971). Those norms are internalized within the process of socialization 
(Fuchs, 2002b). In line, others refer to political socialization (Kimball & Patterson, 
1997, p. 704) as source for the development of a prototype regarding the ways 
members of an political institutions should behave. 
Media framing effects on political attitudes 
Since confidence is conceptualized as a cognitive attitude it is related to the 
subjective perception of political realities. As argued above, mass media’s impact on 
preferences is assumed to be rather low given the role of socialization within a 
political culture. In contrast, media’s influence on social reality perceptions is 
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assumed to be rather intense. Drawing on the concept of subjective perception one 
would argue that neither political processes nor performances themselves are vital 
for the support of political institutions but the citizens subjective perception of it (cf. 
Pfau et al., 1998). The subjective perception is affected by both, a persons socio-
demographic characteristics as well as the information a person got. Past research 
shows that knowledge of political objects (issues, actors, institutions) exerts more 
influence than the socio-demographic status (Pfau et al., 1998, p. 731). Since in 
modern democratic societies citizens’ knowledge of political objects mostly relies on 
mass information (cf. Blödorn, Gerhards, & Klinger, 2005, for Germany) the role of 
media presentation is emphasized. Citizens’ perceptions of reality are shaped by 
media information. 
Concerning media effects on political attitudes a variety of studies focuses on media 
use as explaining variable. Following the tradition of „video malaise“ research 
(Robinson, 1976) studies test the assumption that the more time citizens spend 
watching television, the lower is the level of political support. Recent research 
indicates that the relationship between media use and political attitudes is more 
complex than this hypothesis suggests (cf. Bennett, Rhine, Flickinger, & Bennett, 
1999; Holtz-Bacha, 1990; Moy, Pfau, & Kahlor, 1999; Moy & Scheufele, 2000; Norris, 
2000). 
Building on video malaise research, studies examine the effect not of media use in 
general, but of specific media content aspects. Negative media content in particular 
is identified as determinant of low levels of public confidence. For instance, Miller and 
collaborators (Miller, Goldenberg, & Erbring, 1979) found that media criticism led to 
dissatisfaction with political leaders and policies. In line, several studies indicate that 
negative media content affects attitudes particularly towards persons (Kepplinger, 
2000; Kleinnijenhuis, van Hoof, & Oegema, 2006), but also towards institutions like 
the presidency or the government (T. E. Patterson, 1996). 
Moy and Pfau build on this argument and further investigated the role of negative 
media tones (Moy & Pfau, 2000; Moy, Pfau, & Kahlor, 1999). The authors criticized 
existing research for two reasons, the restricted media sample and it’s focus on 
presidency and the congress. Moy and Pfau did address those voids and combined 
data from two extensive media content analyses of depictions of specific institutions 
and data from multiple surveys conducted over a period of time. They analyzed the 
linkages between how specific media presented certain institutions, people’s media 
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use and the individual perceived confidence of the institution. Contrary to their 
preferences, the authors did find huge variations of media effects. The use of 
newspapers and televisions was associated positive with some institutions and 
negative with others. Regarding the relative lack of mass media influence on 
perceptions of presidency the authors referred to balanced reporting as one aspect 
that might account for it. 
In general, results on the effects of media negativity on political attitudes tent to be 
modest, media use accounts for limited variance in the dependent variable. Further 
studies focus not on valence of media coverage but on media interpretations of 
political events and issues, that is media frames, and their effects on confidence. In 
general terms, framing research indicates that the way events and issues are framed 
in the media can „fundamentally affect how readers and viewers understand those 
events and issues“ (Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997, p. 482). Media frames do not 
only alter the interpretation of a message, but also the activation of knowledge that 
the interpreter brings into the interpretative process. Framing in that sense enhances 
the activating of a set of mental concepts in long-term memory. This set then is used 
in further cognitive tasks, which leads to alterations of individuals’ considerations of 
reality (Price, Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997; Rhee, 1997). 
Cappella and Jamieson (1996) investigated the claim that strategic news frames in 
contrast to mass media’s focus on political issues fosters political cynicism. Strategic 
frames are defined by “winning and losing as the central concern; the language of 
wars, games, and competition; a story with performers, critics, and audience (voters); 
centrality of performance, style, and perception of the candidate; heavy weighing of 
polls and the candidate’s standing in them” (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 33). 
Cynicism is measured through a series of questions about motives of politicians, 
honesty, superficiality and self-interest. Based on various experimental studies 
results indicate that strategic media frames activate distrust as they remind the 
audience of the self-interests of political actors and foster negative perception of 
election campaigns. 
Subsequent research delivers further evidence for media framing effects on political 
cynicism. Moreover, research suggest that strategic media framing not only has an 
effect on attitudes towards particular actors in that stories, but also on general 
confidence in government (Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001). Results of a study 
on media effects on attitudes towards the enlargement of the European Union by De 
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Vreese (2004) do not support the idea that strategic news coverage affects policy 
support, however. Furthermore, research that is not based on laboratory 
experimental settings but panel surveys in combination with media content data 
indicates that “strategic reporting is not per se cynicism-invoking” but is contingent 
upon the intervening condition of the level of strategic reporting in news coverage 
(De Vreese, 2005, p. 284). 
Regarding moderating variables of media framing effects, literature holds evidence 
that besides socio-demographic variables like age and gender, political sophistication 
and involvement matter. Studies indicate that media’s impact on political cynicism is 
stronger for people with low levels of political sophistication or involvement than for 
people with higher levels (De Vreese, 2005; Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001). 
Further, the intervening effect of the intensity of exposure to strategic media frames 
is emphasized (De Vreese, 2005). Possible intervening effects of peoples’ political 
preferences have not been analyzed, however. 
Besley & McComas (2005) suggest to derive specific media frames of political 
strategies in order to improve the theoretical understanding of why strategy-oriented 
media coverage negatively influence political attitudes. The authors propose to 
further differentiate generic, that is issue-unspecific frames such as strategy 
orientation, to find answers to such questions as: „Do frames that highlight the 
neutrality and trustworthiness of the decision makers, or, instead, that focus on a 
politician’s dishonesty […] influence satisfaction with the outcomes? Do frames that 
emphasize the voice that citizens had in the decision or, conversely that emphasize 
that they were turned away at the polls […] influence citizens’ sense of political 
efficacy?” (Besley & McComas, 2005, p. 429). Drawing on research that emphasizes 
the effects of procedural justice on evaluative attitudes (cf. Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 
1996; Tyler, 2000) the authors suggest both control frames that refer to aspects of 
political efficacy as well as frames that refer to relational aspects such as fair and 
respectful behavior of political actors. 
This paper makes an effort to enhance the understanding of why strategy frames 
have negative effects on citizen’s attitudes by drawing on the work of Moy and Pfau 
(2000), Cappella and Jamieson (1996) as well as arguments of Besley and 
McComas (2005) and Hibbing & Theiss-Morse (2002). In the following paper section 
an preference-perception model of media effects is developed as well as a distinct 
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set of specific media frames that correspond to a variety of political preferences and 
aspects of political legitimation. 
 
An preference-perception model of media effects on confidence 
The analytical model developed in this section draws on two arguments elaborated in 
the previous sections of the paper, the moderating role of preferences as intervening 
variable and the deduction of specific media frames as influencing factor of political 
reality perceptions. The model explains how the relationship between political reality 
perceptions that trace back to media coverage and political preferences derived by 
socialization in a political culture accounts for variations in political confidence at the 
individual level. 
Regarding political preferences, the distinction of Tyler, Degoey, and Smith (1996) 
between a relational and instrumental explanation of process based attitudes is 
transferred to outcome based attitudes also. Hence, a set of four dimensions of 
political confidence is distinguished here. For the input dimension: procedural control 
(instrumental) and procedural justice (relational), for the output dimension: 
distributive justice (relational) and outcome utility (instrumental). The following 
paragraphs will explain those dimensions. 
Drawing on work from social psychology it is argued that procedural justice affects 
attitudes towards institutions (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Tyler, 2000). Concerning 
explanations why perceived fairness matters, research indicates that the impact of 
perceived fairness it is not only motivated by self-interest, but also by relational 
arguments. In the framework of an instrumental explanation it is argued that “when 
they give up control to a third party, people seek to maintain some degree of indirect 
control over the decisions of those authorities, for example, through the presentation 
of evidence” (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996, p. 913). However, studies indicate that 
the impact of perceived fairness, neutrality or trustworthiness of processes is not only 
motivated by self-interest but also can be explained by relational judgments. 
Relational explanations refer to the group-value model that assumes that “fair 
treatment and decision-making by group authorities communicates to group 
members two symbolic messages” that relate to feelings of pride and respect, which 
in turn moderate group-related attitudes (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996, p. 914). 
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A variety of studies attests the influence of indicators of political outputs such as 
economic growth, unemployment, inflation as well as individual perception of those 
aspects on confidence (Citrin, 1974; Gilley, 2006). Rational explanations of that 
relationship refer to citizens’ self-interest and argue that a political institution is 
supported to the extent that it provides the preferred outcomes. An instrumental 
explanation of the relevance of output aspects could thus be called outcome utility. 
On the other hand, people might support political decisions if those decisions ensure 
distributive justice. A relational explanation hence would refer to the equitable 
distribution of costs and revenues among the citizenry. 
Preferences are conceptualized as individual normative political values that are 
developed in the process of socialization within a political culture. The term value 
here refers to relatively stable, individual-level predispositions on how political 
institutions should work and the sort of output they should produce.2 Political culture 
shapes the importance or weight citizens give to different set of values, fairness of 
political processes (procedural control), respect of political actors (procedural justice), 
effectiveness of political decisions (outcome utility) and the outcome contribution to 
the common good (distributive justice), namely. In consensus democracies like 
Switzerland for instance, citizens expect that political decisions should be made by 
trying to find a compromise between diverging interests (Linder & Steffen, 2006). 
Accordingly, procedural justice aspects like respect, fairness and neutrality of political 
processes are rather important values in consensus democracies. Further, due to 
direct democratic elements, internal efficacy is of greater value. In contrast, citizens 
of adversarial systems like the US, Great Britain, and to certain extend also 
Germany3 (which also holds consensus elements), are not as much interested in 
forms of direct participation, but would expect the majority to make their own 
decisions. Accordingly, aspects like the effectiveness of decisions and their 
contribution to the public good are very important values in adversarial democracies 
(Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). 
This paper argues that confidence is based on the perception that the expected 
norms are institutionalized or political actors behave according to those individual 
                                                 
2  The rather broader conceptualization of preferences with focus on the role of socialization results 
from two concerns. First, citizens might not have any more specified preferences concerning how 
institutions should work (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001b). Further, the influencing role of media 
information is assumed to be rather low in that case, as values are conceptualized as relatively stable 
attitudes. 
3 Research however indicates that there is not one political culture in Germany, but people in East- 
and West-Germany hold different attitudes (Fuchs, 1999). The project will take this into account. 
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preferences. The perceptions of political realities are shaped by media coverage. 
From the assumption that preferences moderate mass media’s impact it follows that 
criteria for the analysis of media content have to be reconciled with those preference 
items. In other words, measures of strategic news frame have to be refined and a 
distinct set of specific news frames is to be developed. The specific frames are to be 
derived from political legitimation aspects as discussed in the literature and have to 
correspond to the different dimensions of political preferences  
I draw on the comprehensive work of Hurrelman and collaborators (Hurrelmann, 
Krell-Laluhová, Lhotta, Nullmeier, & Schneider, 2005; Hurrelmann, Krell-Laluhová, & 
Schneider, 2005) which have extracted patterns that play a prominent role in the 
theoretic literature on legitimation and continuously expanded this list with new 
patterns the authors identified based on an analysis of legitimation-related mass 
media content in Great Britain, Switzerland and the United States. Besides 
responsiveness as an relevant aspect of political processes (Fuchs, 1993, p. 102ff.), 
other aspects of political process that relate to the input dimension are transparency, 
participation, accountability, respectfulness, fairness, credibility, neutrality, 
accountability, esteem and efficacy (Hurrelmann, Krell-Laluhová, Lhotta, Nullmeier, & 
Schneider, 2005). As for the quality of political outcomes, Fuchs (1993, p. 102ff.) 
focuses on the aspect of their effectiveness. Other output related aspects are the 
efficacy of political decisions, the favorability of political outcomes, their contribution 
to common good, distributive justice, acceptance and individual favorability of political 
decisions (Hurrelmann, Krell-Laluhová, Lhotta, Nullmeier, & Schneider, 2005). 
In total, 17 specific media frames are distinguished in this paper, they can occur in 
media coverage in positive, negative, or ambivalent valence. Those specific frames 
are conceptualized as differentiation of the established generic frames and can be 
assigned to them accordingly. Table 1 displays the classification of generic and 
specific media frames. Drawing on framing theory, it is argued that media frames of 
political processes and outputs affect the citizens’ pictures of how a political 
institution operates and the quality of the outcomes. Thus, the assumed political 
reality perceptions that those media frames evoke and the dimension of political 
preference that those aspects relate to are also included in table 1. 
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Generic Media Frame 
Specific Media frames 
with positive / negative 
valence 
Political Reality Perceptions Dimension of related political preference 
Personalization vs.  
Collective orientation 
Transparency of behavior 
of political actors  
Political decisions are the result of individual 
actors´ interests and actions / collective interests 
and actions. 
Procedural control  
(instrumental) 
(input, throughput) 
Conflict orientation vs. 
Consensus orientation 
Respectfulness of 
behavior of political actors  
 
 
Fairness of behavior of 
political actors 
Political actors or institutions disagree, political 
processes are shaped by power struggles. 
Political decisions are / are not made by finding 
compromises, talking to each other and finding a 
consensus. 
Political actors do / do not treat each other 
respectfully. 
Political decisions are / are not made collectively 
and not just by a few decision takers high in their 
hierarchical standing. 
Political actors do / do not treat each other fairly.  
Procedural justice 
(relational) 
(throughput) 
 
Moral framing 
Responsiveness of 
political actors or 
institutions (External 
efficacy) 
 
Impact of citizens on 
political actors or 
institutions (Internal 
efficacy) 
 
Credibility of political 
actors or institutions 
 
Neutrality of political 
actors 
 
Accountability of political 
actors 
 
Participation of citizens / 
in institutions 
 
“Closed doors” 
Political actors or institutions take account / do not 
take account of citizens´ needs.  
 
 
 
Citizens’ opinions have / do not have an impact on 
political decisions / actions. 
 
 
 
Political actors or institutions are / are not credible. 
 
 
Political actors are / are not neutral and not let by 
the interests of others. 
 
Political actors or institutions are / are not 
responsible and accountable for their decisions 
and actions.  
 
Political institutions ensure / do not ensure 
citizens´ opportunities to actively participate in 
political processes. 
 
Intimacy is a relevant aspect of successful political 
decisions / Political decisions should not take 
place behind closed doors.  
 
Procedural control 
(instrumental) 
(input, throughput) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Esteem of citizens by 
political actors 
Political actors do esteem / do not esteem citizens 
as responsible and rational partner in a 
democracy. 
Procedural justice 
(relational) 
(throughput) 
 Common good 
 
Distribution 
Political decisions do / do not take responsibility of 
the common good. 
Political decisions do / do not consider that costs 
and revenues are equitably distributed. 
Distributive justice 
(relational)  
(output) 
 
Failure vs.  
Success 
Effectiveness of political 
outputs 
 
Efficiency of political 
decision-making or actions 
Political decisions are / are not an effective 
solution of the societal problem. 
 
The expenses of finding a problem solution and 
implementing it are / are not  appropriate. 
Outcome utility 
(instrumental) 
(output) 
 
 
 Acceptance of political 
outputs 
Political decisions are / are not accepted by the 
citizenry. 
Distributive justice 
(relational)  
(output) 
 
Winning and losing Favorability of decisions 
Political decisions are / are not more useful for 
certain groups in society that it is the case for 
others. 
Outcome utility 
(instrumental) 
(output) 
Table 1: Media frames, political reality perceptions and related political preferences 
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Generic frames and specific media frames constitute the independent variable of the 
preference-perception model of media effects to be developed in this paper. More 
precisely, those frames that define regular and salient media patterns of describing 
political decision-making procedures and political outcomes are the independent 
variable.4 Drawing on framing theory of media effects, salient and regular media 
patterns are assumed to shape citizens’ perceptions of political reality and constitute 
some sort of the “input” of the evaluative judgment regarding confidence in political 
institutions. As the media frames are related to different confidence dimensions 
(procedural control, procedural justice, distributive justice and outcome utility, cf. 
figure 1) the corresponding aspects of political reality are altered. 
The main argument of this paper is that preferences moderate mass media’s impact 
on political confidence. Preferences here refer to political values that define 
normative prototypes of how political processes should work and the outcomes they 
should produce. Four dimensions of those preferences are distinguished here: 
procedural control, procedural justice, distributive justice and outcome utility. Shaped 
by the political culture which individuals are socialized in, they give different values to 
those dimensions. The value of the normative dimensions influences the evaluative 
judgments in the way that important aspects of political confidence and according 
preferences will exert more influence than less important ones. 
Confidence in political institutions, then, results from the relationship between 
perceptions (“input” of evaluative judgments) and preferences (benchmark), as the 
model in figure 1 illustrates. To illustrate this with an example: By presenting a 
political process as determined by conflicts between various groups of actors, media 
might affect a person’s perception of the fairness aspect of political decision-making. 
The impression might be that political actors do not treat each other fairly. Given that 
this person values procedural justice to be important in order to come to collectively 
binding decisions, media information would influence confidence of this person in a 
specific political institution negatively. For another person that was exposed to the 
same media content but does not value procedural justice, media information would 
exert less influence on confidence in this institutions. 
Based on the model in figure 1 it is possible to derive specific hypotheses on the 
question of why media content fosters decline in confidence and under what 
circumstances this is the case. The model suggests that the greater the discrepancy 
                                                 
4 Which frames define regular and salient media patterns is a question open to empirical research and 
will be addressed in the project. 
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between preferences and perceptions, the lower the levels of confidence. In that 
sense, media information that challenges citizens’ preferences might account for 
lower confidence levels. The more weight citizens give those aspects, the greater the 
influence of media information on the evaluative judgments will be. In other words, 
the probability that the confidence level of an individual A is higher than the 
confidence level of an individual B, given both are exposed to the same media 
content, increases with the congruence of preferences and perceptions of individual 
A compared to that of person B. 
 
Figure 1. Preference-Perception model of media effects on confidence 
 
Considering the role of political culture in shaping individuals’ preferences, 
hypotheses not only on the individual level but also on a macro level could be derived 
from the model. For instance, the following hypotheses could be tested: In consensus 
democracies, media coverage that positively highlights relational aspects of political 
processes has a major positive effect on confidence, whereas media information that 
positively highlights aspects of distributive justice has a minor positive effect. In 
adversarial democracies, outcome utility focused media information with positive 
valence has a major positive effect on confidence, whereas media information with 
positive reference to procedural justice has a minor positive effect. 
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Discussion 
This paper argues that mass media’s impact on political attitudes is moderated by 
citizens’ political preferences. The novelty of the model developed in this paper is the 
integration of political preferences as moderating variable. The model’s aim is to 
contribute to the empirical investigation of important questions. On this basis it is 
possible to derive specific hypotheses that consider the intervening role of political 
preferences. Furthermore, the paper proposes specific media frames that can be 
operationalized. On this basis, the global statement, media coverage tends to foster 
a decline in levels of political confidence could be further differentiated. 
Further, the model developed in this paper seeks to provide answers to the question 
of why certain media coverage negatively affects political attitudes. Moreover, it 
allows defining circumstances under which media patterns might contribute to a 
increase in confidence levels. Although recent research takes those aspects into 
account, they are still research voids. 
The most important implication that can be drawn from the proposed model is that 
media coverage patterns are not per se a challenge for political support in 
democracies. Rather, certain media patterns threat political confidence if they 
challenge a citizen’s political preferences. Political preferences serve as explanation 
of individual-level variations in confidence levels. Moreover, the model could be used 
to explain dynamic changes in opinion levels as a response to shifts in perceived 
political realities due to changes in media patterns a person is exposed to. As the 
paper emphasizes the role of political values that an individual derives within a 
political culture, the model might also be useful for the investigation of variances in 
confidence levels in different political cultures or nations. 
Altogether, then, the preference-perception model contributes to the analysis of 
citizens’ political attitudes. It specifies in greater detail than previous research how 
patterns of media coverage interact with existing political preferences in forming 
individual attitudes of political confidence. 
To test if the assumed relationships and causal links hold, empirical research is 
needed. A study will be conducted within the project’s framework. The project’s 
empirical program combines a media content analysis in a comparative perspective 
across countries (Germany and Switzerland), and time (1960ies, 1980ies and years 
of 2000), survey data in both a time- and nation- (political culture) comparative 
perspective as well as an experimental study with 589 Swiss citizens. 
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